

**Title: Legislative activities and quality of democracy: Swedish Riksdag as a Case**

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**Abstract**

The three-fold role of a legislature – representation, lawmaking, and oversight – has been an essential element for measuring democratic quality. Despite broad recognition of its essentiality, the patterns of activities and quality of legislatures have not drawn academic attraction. The aim of this article is to fill the gap. The article looks for patterns of activities of legislative members. This study adopts three hypotheses: Hypothesis 1. The opposition parties tend to be more active in the legislatures since they aim at checking the government power. By laying more motions the opposition parties would show the voters how effectively they endeavor to check the government party (parties); Hypothesis 1-1. In parliamentary activities, there seems to be no remarkable difference between male and female MPs. At the same time, it seems also crucial to point out that female interest can be articulated by more active presentation of motions among the female legislators; Hypothesis 2. The older the law-makers reach, the higher rate of motion presentation seems to be true. When legislators reach fifties in their age, the rate of motion presentation culminates and thereafter it drops dramatically again. To test these hypotheses, the Swedish Riksdag database of parliamentary activities was used. The database includes entire set of parliamentary activities including number of parliamentary motions, interpellation, written questions directed to cabinet ministers and activities in standing committees of all MPs. This study broadly confirms that there is clear difference in parliamentary activities measured by motion presentation between ruling and opposition parties. The MPs of opposition party prove to be more active in motion presentation than those with ruling party affiliation. All three opposition party MPs showed overwhelmingly high rate of motion presentation. The two other hypotheses measuring gender (H1-1) and age (H 2) show that Phillips' argument of politics of presence seems to be more plausible than that of Vianello & Moore's no-difference theory between leadership activities. As far as the age factor is concerned, political cycle effect in the parliamentary activities seems also broadly approved by the empirical data. At the age of late 40s to middle 50s, MPs are most active and thereafter the degree of activities drops consecutively. Despite some methodological drawbacks, findings of this study seem to be crucial to broaden our understanding of the quality of parliament measured by motion activities.

Keywords: parliamentarian behavior, political effectiveness, quality of democracy, Sweden, gender gap, age, opposition party, party system

### *Introduction*

Capacity of legislatures (parliament, congress or national assembly) is regarded as a crucial element of measuring democratic quality. When legislatures do have capacity to check and control the executive effectively, it is more likely that the work of government becomes more transparent and accountable (Beetham 1994). Previous comparative studies have witnessed that the legislative capacity varied in terms of polity, degree of centralization and number of chambers – presidential or parliamentary; federal-unitary; bicameral or unicameral (Lijphart 1999; Keman 2002; Hague & Harrop 2010; van de Walle 2002). Lijphart argues that quality of government can be measured mainly by ten political system variables.<sup>1</sup> In established democracies, quality of government was argued to be closely linked to patterns of civil society, governmental will and capability to restrain rampant corruption and to manage free and fair elections (Choe 1997; Choe & Darnolf 2000; Rothstein 2008; Lindvall & Rothstein 2010; Putnam 1993 & 2000).

Despite the role of legislatures is an essential element for measuring democratic quality, these variables do not concern the functions of legislatures. Legislatures' basic functions are three-fold: representation, lawmaking, and oversight (Johnson 2005; Torstensen & Amundsen 2010: 13-15). In terms of function of legislative oversight, Johnson (2005) as well as Wehner et al. (2007) depict that when legislatures are weak and may not check the executive effectively, the political system can be classified only as a rubber stamp (Johnson 2005; Wehner 2007: 21). The mechanism of so-called horizontal accountability holds the executive to account through a vote of no confidence as well as active involvement in raising questions and opposing motions against government bills, whereas the vertical accountability is a key element of the core functions of parliament; representation of voters at the central level of the political system (O'Donnell 1998; Tostensen & Amundsen 2010:5; Case 2011: 3).

Despite broad academic recognition of its essentiality, the patterns of activities and quality of legislatures have not drawn rigorous scholarly attention. This work will fill the gap. The aim of the paper is therefore to search for patterns of activities of legislative members. The lawmaking process can be realized through screening of governmental bills and laying parliamentary motions. Both functions are of equal importance in law-making process in

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<sup>1</sup> In measuring the quality of government, besides the three variables mentioned, Lijphart includes following variables: effective number of parliamentary parties, patterns of government (one-party or coalition government), electoral disproportionality, interest group pluralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review and central bank independence.

established as well as emerging democracies. At the same time, there are different sources of activities of the members of parliament (hereafter MPs): parliamentary motions, interpellation, written questions and activities in standing committees to be also of relevance to be partly included in this study.

*Activities of the Swedish Riksdag members as a research object*

Holmberg and Esaiasson are two pioneers in study of ideological conceptions and behaviors of MPs in the Swedish parliament *Riksdag*. MPs depicted as representatives, opinion-leaders, and law-makers carry different functions (Holmberg 1989; Holmberg & Esaiasson 1988:19 & 1996). Their 1988 study was based on a survey with the Riksdag members. Despite diverse analyses of ideological conceptions and behaviors of the Riksdag members, they failed to include patterns of parliamentary activities such as laying motions, attending interpellations, sending written questions, and activities in standing committees.

In recent years, placing critical stance from previous experiences, Pålsson warns the powerlessness and ineffectiveness of the Riksdag as a democratic institution in terms of concentration of power on the government as a prolonged arm of the parliament (Pålsson 2008 & 2011). As argued in Tosten & Amunsen (2010), Pålsson pointed out that it is not the individual MPs who may represent voters at the local level but their party loyalty which sets the course of parliamentary activities. To vitalize the Swedish parliamentary political system, she proposes that personal voting system should be reinforced and that state subsidy for parliamentary work should be allocated for personal use of the MPs. Otherwise, the Riksdag will be fallen into a powerless vehicle through which more power may fall under the hands of the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers.

As for general motion period, there have been broad parliamentary debates. The general motion period covers approximately two weeks around the submission of annual budget bill. The number of motions varied between 2500 and 5000 motions between 1987 and 2010. Despite the high rate of motions laid, the approval rate was as low as 0.5 percent.<sup>2</sup> Parliamentary motions may also be submitted in conjunction to government proposition presented to the Parliament. The Riksdag members may present their own alternative motions which oppose to the government proposal. Magnitude of parliamentary motions was argued to

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Sa-funkar-riksdagen/Riksdagens-uppgifter/Beslutar-om-statsbudgeten/Inkomster-utgifter-och-skulder1/Budgetpropositionen/Allmanna-motionstiden/>

be a subject of reform by abolishing (Motion 2010/11:K349, Motion 2009/10:K358; Motion 1999/2000:K333), prolonging (Motion 2009/10:K358) or separating (Motion 1996/97:K324) general motion period since its extreme size results in increased costs of administration and treatment of the standing committees (SvD 2009-10-4). Despite the general motion system was exposed to longstanding parliamentary debates, reform of current system has never occurred since broad consensus of newly designed open system could not be reached.

### *Scope of the study*

The Swedish Riksdag provides datasets of parliamentary activities. The database includes entire set of parliamentary activities including number of parliamentary motions, interpellation, written questions directed to cabinet ministers and activities in standing committees of all MPs. Activities of former members from 1991 to incumbent members may be also traced back. It provides a unique possibility for researchers and journalists alike to scrutinize patterns of parliamentary activities in Sweden.

Diverse activities of the Swedish Riksdag members will be scrutinized for in-depth analysis. The scope of material includes activities of the Riksdag members during the period of 2006-2010. During this period, four right-wing parties built a coalition government led by Fredrik Reinfeldt as the Prime Minister. The Social Democratic Party was the biggest party with 34.99 percent of seat in the Parliament followed by the Left Party (v) by 5.85 percent of seats and by the Green Party (mp) by 5.24 percent of seats. The largest party in the government was the conservative Moderate Party by 26.22 percent of seat rate followed by the Center Party (c), the Liberal party (fp) and the Christian Democrat (kd).

Table 1. Party (2006-2010)

Parties	Opposition parties			Ruling parties				
	S	v	mp	c	fp	kd	m	
% of seats	34.99	5.85	5.24	7.88	7.54	6.59	26.22	100
No. of seats	130	22	19	29	28	24	97	349
Block sum	171 (48.99%)			178 (51.59%)				349 (100%)

Source: [www.val.se](http://www.val.se)

Note: s (Socialdemokraterna - Social Democratic Party), v (Vänsterpartiet - Left Party), mp (Miljöpartiet – Green Party), c (Centerpartiet – Center Party), fp (Folkpartiet Liberalerna – Liberal Party), kd (Kristdemokraterna – Christian Democratic Party), m (Moderaterna – Conservative Moderate Party)

## *Research hypotheses*

### Hypothesis 1

The opposition parties tend to be more active in the legislatures since they aim at checking the government power. By laying more motions the opposition parties would show the voters how effectively they endeavor to check the government party (parties).

In Handbook of National Legislatures, Parliamentary Power Index (PPI) was used for measuring strength of legislatures in terms of four dimensions: (1) a legislature's capacity to influence the executive, (2) to remain autonomous from the executive, (3) to exercise sundry subsidiary powers, and (4) to access various resources (Fish and Kroening 2009).

Thus, the first hypothesis will explore the Fish and Kroening's indicators (1) of PPI and O'Donnell's horizontal accountability theorem.

### Hypotheses 1-1

Women in politics in general seem to be less active than men. However, according to Vianello & Moore's study of global female leaders of 27 industrial nations there is no remarkable discrepancy in terms of gender difference. From survey and interview studies among top global business and political leaders, Vianello & Moore drew a conclusion that the top leaders have not shown any remarkable difference in their conception on leadership role and behaviors at the leadership positions (Vianello & Moore 2000). According to them, leadership requires similar patterns of behavior and attitudes to lead an organization. There is no difference in leading a business organizations or political institutions.

However, a contrasting argument was presented by Anne Phillips in *Politics of Presence*. According to Phillip, interest of female can be most effectively achieved by higher representation of female groups. Likewise, the female interest can be effectively realized through active presentation of parliamentary motions (Phillips 1998). Thus, our hypothesis to be tested can be formed like this: In parliamentary activities, there seems to be no remarkable difference between male and female MPs; at the same time, it seems also crucial to point out that female interest can be articulated by more active presentation of motions among the female leaders. Which hypothesis will be more plausible?

### Hypothesis 2

Parliamentary activities require certain level of knowledge and techniques that would motivate MPs to carry out the parliamentary works. Being a routine and professional law-maker requires time for training and learning. This process demands a certain period of parliamentary work. In her report from experiences in Riksdag, Pålsson agrees that trial-and-error seems to be inevitable to learn and know the internal norms and rules in the Riksdag (Pålsson 2011: 219). Age and certain level of experience seem to be necessary to understand how the system works and reach a convenient position to work alone or in group for presentation of motions. Therefore, the older the law-makers reach, the higher rate of motion presentation seems to be true.

However, according to what Schlesinger and Hain argue, the climax of political age is at the age of 50s since the political activities require certain level of energy and ambition. They call this as a political cycle based on three phases: 20-30s for learning, 40-50 reaching climax, and over 60s with waning period in human life (Schlesinger 1966; Hain 1974).

### *Findings*

Among the Swedish Riksdag members, the maximum size of motion presentation reaches 452 with average number of 104.9 during the four-year of parliamentary office period between 2006 and 2010. The high level of standard deviation implies that there are big differences in parliamentary work between the active and passive law-makers. The largest number of motions was presented at the level of 59-99 followed by 0-49. The first two levels consist of 57.9 percent of the total number of 349 members. To our surprise, there are 9 MPs who presented more than 300 parliamentary motions to the Riksdag. These include both general motion period and rest of the period in conjunction to government bills laid by the government.

**Table 1. Average Number of Motions (2006-2010)**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
No. of motions	349	0	452	104,92	81,328
Valid N (listwise)	349				

**Table 2. Number of Motions**

	Frequency	Percent
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0-49	97	27,8
50-99	105	30,1
100-149	63	18,1
150-199	37	10,6
200-249	25	7,2
250-299	13	3,7
300-	9	2,6
Total	349	100,0

Source: Riksdag webpage. <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/Hitta-ledamot/Sagt--gjort/>

Table 3 depicts patterns of motion presentation by party. What the data show is that patterns of motion presentation is broadly spread among the left-oriented parties. Three left-oriented parties are well-balanced between the lowest and the highest, while the four ruling parties are concentrated around first four layers between 0-49 and 150-199. However, the largest groups among the four ruling parties are the first two layer groups. As depicted in Table 4, the average number of parliamentary motions for the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party and Green Party is respectively 132,1, 265,7, and 203,6. These high average score can be contrasted to those of four ruling right-wing parties. The highest average number of motions among the four ruling right-wing parties can be found at the Liber Party (fp) with 66,3 contrasted to the number of the conservative Moderate Party (m) with 50.5.

**Table 3. Number of Member of Parliament by Size of Motions and Party Affiliation (2006-2010)**

	s	v	mp	c	fp	kd	m	Total
0-49	9			12	11	13	50	95
50-99	32	1	3	13	10	7	40	106
100-149	42		2	3	6	4	6	63
150-199	28	2	5		1		1	37
200-249	16	6	3					25
250-299	2	7	4					13
300-349		4						4
350-399	1		1					2
400-		2	1					3
Total	129	22	19	28	28	24	97	349

Source: Riksdag webpage. <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/Hitta-ledamot/Sagt--gjort/>

Difference between blocks seems to be clear. The leftist block average reaches 200,5, while that of the four right-wing parties 56.5. The block difference in average number of motions shows 144 between two blocks. This is the clear evidence of parliamentary activities. The

three leftist parties are remarkably active than the rest of ruling parties. Table 5 confirms that party difference in parliamentary motions is proved to be true. In other words, the party difference in motion presentation is statistically significant. Thus, our first hypothesis on block different between ruling and opposition blocks can be confirmed. The opposition parties show clear tendency that they are eager to check and control the government through active motion presentation. This will render very effective strategy for opposition parties with motions as effective tool to control the government. The number of motions increases in the election year.<sup>3</sup> This also confirms our Hypothesis 1 once again. Thus, the Fish and Kroening's first PPI index - legislature's capacity to influence the executive – should be clearly confirmed with the Swedish data. At the same time, O'Donnell's horizontal accountability theorem can also be generally approved.

**Table 4. Average Number of Motions Laid by Member of Parliament (2006-2010)**

	s	v	mp	c	fp	kd	m	
Average number per party	132,1	265,7	203,6	55,6	66,3	53,4	50,5	Average 119,8
Average number per block	200,5			56,5				L-R +144

Source: Riksdag webpage. <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/Hitta-ledamot/Sagt-gjort/>

**Table 5. Chi-Square Test of Group Difference between Parties in Motion Presentation**

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	303,117 <sup>a</sup>	36	,000
Likelihood Ratio	275,207	36	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	104,426	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	349		

a. 27 cells (55,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,49.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Sa-funkar-riksdagen/Riksdagens-uppgifter/Beslutar-om-statsbudgeten/Inkomster-utgifter-och-skulder1/Budgetpropositionen/Allmanna-motionstiden/>



As shown in Figure 1, as far as the relationship between age and degree of motion activities is concerned, our hypothesis selected may also be clearly approved. The average number of motion at the level of 105 meets around 48 year-old age. It means that at the age of around 48 the level of motion presentation culminates and after that age, the motion rate drops gradually. The star shape with long tails, however, show that there are many MPs to present more than 200 motions during the four-year term. Thus, the close relationship between age of MPs with higher number of parliamentary motion can be confirmed. Political cycle model of Schlesinger & Hain measured by motion activities with the Riksdag seems to be relevant.




Figure 1. Number of motion by age

Sorting out the groups with higher number of motion presentation, we may figure out the role of age more clearly. Table 6 shows the relationship between number of motions over 150 by gender, age groups and party affiliation. No doubt that there is a close relationship between number of motions and age. At the age of 50s, the number of motions culminates on both male and female groups. This pattern may be found among both three leftist parties and two right-wing parties. Among those with 150 motions and more, the age factor may also be approved. Thus, Hypothesis 2 based on Schlesinger's and Hain's empirical studies was approved again by our data.

Table 6. Number of Motions over 150 by Gender, Age Groups and Party

s

	Male	Female	Sum	%
-29	0	0	0	0%
30-39	2	4	6	12.76%
40-49	6	4	10	21.27%
<b>50-59</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>48.93%</b>
60+	3	5	8	17.02%
Sum	19	28	47	99.98%

v

	Male	Female	Sum	%
-29	0	0	0	0%
30-39	1	1	2	9.52%
40-49	1	2	3	14.28%
<b>50-59</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>61.90%</b>
60+	1	2	3	14.28%
Sum	8	13	21	99.98%

mp

	Male	Female	Sum	%
-29	0	0	0	0%
30-39	1	1	2	14.28%
40-49	3	1	4	28.57%
<b>50-59</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>57.14%</b>
60+	0	0	0	0%
Sum	8	6	14	99.99%

Four ruling coalition parties

	Male	Female	Sum	%
-29	0	0	0	
30-39	0	0	0	
40-49	0	0	0	
<b>50-59</b>	<b>1 (m)</b>	<b>1 (fp)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>100%</b>
60+	0	0	0	
Sum	1	1	2	

Source: Riksdag webpage. <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/Hitta-ledamot/Sagt--gjort/>

Note: s (Socialdemokraterna - Social Democratic Party), v (Vänsterpartiet - Left Party), mp (Miljöpartiet – Green Party), fp (Folkpartiet Liberalerna – Liberal Party), m (Moderaterna – Conservative Moderate Party)

Table 6, however, leaves us at the stage of dilemma as for the relation between parliamentary activity measured by motion presentation and gender. In comparison of two gender groups, more female MPs are presented among the 50s old ages. Within the Social Democratic Party, 15 female and 8 male members consisting in total 48.93 percent of the entire group represent age group of 50s. Female group exceeds by 7 members. This pattern can be found in the Left

Party. But this pattern vanishes among the Green Party members and two right-oriented government parties. How can this uncertainty influence our conclusion then? Let us move on the MPs with maximum number of motion presentation.

Table 7. Largest Motions Laid by Member of Parliament (2006-2010)

	s	v	mp	c	fp	kd	m
Number of motions (individual motion)	387 (154)	437 (0)	422 (53)	111 (17)	158 (33)	121 (69)	157 (12)
Individual motion rate	39,8	0	12,6	15,3	20,9	57,0	7,6
Number of written questions	260	29	11	6	26	29	22
Number of interpellation	29	19	28	3	0	5	81
Gender	Female	Female	Male	Female	Female	Famale	Male
Age (2006)	50	60	56	62	49	54	51
No. of years of MP before 2006	10	4	2	8	0	6	0 (started in 2006 as a substitute)

Source: Riksdag webpage. <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/Hitta-ledamot/Sagt-gjort/>

As shown in Table 7, five out of seven MPs representing different parties are woman at the age ranging between 49 and 62. The Social Democratic MP shows the most remarkable feature. Even though the number of motion is a bit lower than other two leftist party MPs, the Social Democrat is superior in almost all indicators: rate of individual motions laid, number of written question and number of interpellation (except for one case of the Moderate MP with higher number of 81). Except for the Green Party MP, rest of the MPs with highest number of motion presentation has at least four years of apprenticeship for learning and training the parliamentary procedures. Thus, the data lead us to a preliminary conclusion on relation between gender, age and parliamentary activity. As for the Hypothesis 1-1, Phillips' theorem of politics of presentation seems to be statistically approved.

## Conclusion

The main concern of this study was to explore quality of parliament and activities of MPs such as motion presentation, interpellation, written question and activities in standing committees. The main task of the study was to test check-and-balance between executive and the legislature, i.e. horizontal accountability of the legislature. At the same time, age and gender factor were also to be explored to search for patterns of political activities among the MPs in the Swedish Riksdag during the parliamentary periods of 2006-2010.

This study broadly confirms that there is clear difference in parliamentary activities measured by motion presentation between ruling and opposition parties. The MPs of opposition party are more active in motion presentation than those with ruling party affiliation. All three opposition party MPs showed overwhelmingly high rate of motion presentation. The two other hypotheses measuring gender (H1-1) and age (H 2) show that Phillips' argument of politics of presence seems to be more plausible than that of Vianello & Moore's no-difference theory between leadership activities. As far as the age factor is concerned, political cycle effect in the parliamentary activities seems also broadly approved by the empirical data. At the age of late 40s to middle 50s, MPs are most active and thereafter the degree of activities drops consecutively.

The findings, however, should be interpreted with extra caution. This study is based on one four-year period of parliamentary activities in Sweden. The findings of opposition party activities should be compared with data measuring parliamentary activities with the opposite situation. The patterns of leftist party affiliation with ruling position should be taken into consideration to generalize the finding. At the same time, this study is based on a case study of the Swedish Riksdag MPs. To make a broader understanding with generalization capacity, our data should be exposed to comparison with other polities with presidential system, two-party system, and different types of electoral system. That is, the so-called external validity should be considered to increase our adaptability of the findings with the Swedish context.

One methodological drawback should also be mentioned. The data used for this study is mainly based on number of motions laid by the MPs. However, motions laid by single or multiple members were not separated. For example, the case of the Left Party member with largest number of motion presentation unveils that high rate of motion presentation does not mean that those MPs are most active in carrying out parliamentary works. Those who work with single-member motions should be weighted for measuring degree of parliamentary activities. At the same time, all types of parliamentary activities even including interpellation,

written questions and activities in standing committees should be broadly explored. This study fails to include such activities seriously.

Despite some methodological drawbacks, findings of this study seem to be crucial to broaden our understanding of the quality of parliament measured by motion activities. In emerging democracies, corruption is usually higher than that in well established democracies. The higher corruption seems to be the case partly because the quality of legislature is much lower in new democracies. When MPs have more time to drink whisky or play golf with public tax in their office hours, there are more propensities that politics can corrupt. In that sense, those who work harder in legislature to check and control the government work can increase more democratic accountability.

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Motion 1999/2000:K333

Motion 2009/10:K358

Motion 2009/10:K358

Motion 2010/11:K349

**Appendix. Number of motions presented by party affiliation**

s (Socialdemokraterna - Social Democratic Party), v (Vänsterpartiet - Left Party), mp (Miljöpartiet – Green Party), c (Centerpartiet – Center Party), fp (Folkpartiet Liberalerna – Liberal Party), kd (Kristdemokraterna – Christian Democratic Party), m (Moderaterna – Conservative Moderate Party)

	s	v	mp	c	fp	kd	m	Total
0-49	9 members (38, 45, 48, 0, 31, 36, 35, 1, 25)			12 members (27, 14, 42, 42, 44, 41, 26, 15, 17, 33, 39, 28)	11 members (0, 24, 7, 42, 10, 23, 0, 40, 4, 42, 48)	13 members (0, 8, 34, 25, 42, 36, 35, 48, 29, 0, 43, 7, 21)	50 members (47, 17, 26, 38, 27, 30, 35, 33, 31, 28, 42, 17, 11, 42, 8, 44, 32, 38, 5, 33, 14, 42, 14, 15, 19, 42, 20, 0, 24, 1, 14, 42, 16, 41, 16, 49, 45, 6, 45, 45, 3, 47, 29, 39, 33, 0, 20, 23, 39, 12)	95 members 2501 Average 26.3
50-99	32 members (89, 67, 65, 91, 96, 87, 99, 91, 68, 91, 91, 84, 73, 57, 92, 92, 55, 90, 82, 98, 78, 91, 58, 50, 86, 97, 60, 70, 91, 83, 73, 65)	1 member (94)	3 members (69, 85, 51)	13 members (99, 87, 64, 62, 70, 51, 69, 50, 69, 68, 55, 60, 65)	10 members (86, 53, 80, 56, 68, 84, 57, 55, 64, 96)	7 members (91, 54, 57, 70, 54, 97, 88)	40 members (64, 99, 63, 58, 57, 65, 93, 85, 57, 50, 88, 63, 75, 63, 62, 57, 57, 93, 59, 62, 64, 56, 53, 91, 88, 55, 76, 73, 56, 62, 58, 57, 91, 63, 58, 78,	106 members 7620 Average 71.9



							91, 60, 38, 44)	
100-149	42 members (100, 100, 135, 145, 109, 110, 109, 145, 130, 139, 141, 147, 144, 136, 146, 103, 119, 119, 123, 116, 107, 141, 107, 105, 137, 149, 112, 113, 120, 115, 113, 121, 123, 126, 107, 120, 122, 131, 135, 102, 131, 121)		2 members (121, 140)	3 members (108, 100, 111)	6 members (140, 137, 111, 134, 106, 130)	4 members (121, 112, 108, 101)	6 members (109, 116, 118, 136, 102, 139)	63 members 7665 Average 121.7
150-199	28 members (170, 198, 164, 158, 155, 153, 199, 175, 162, 183, 189, 181, 163, 171, 181, 151, 161, 181, 162, 159, 174, 191, 193, 180, 152, 169, 161, 156)	2 members (188, 183)	5 members (194, 158, 177, 156, 162)		1 member (158)		1 members (157)	37 members 6325 Average 170.9
200-249	16 members (200, 221, 229, 204, 222, 237, 211, 208, 207, 207, 212,	6 members (219, 223, 209, 231, 247, 236)	3 members (208, 226, 236)					25 mebers 5515 Average 220.6

	221, 231, 230, 210, 229)							
250- 299	2 members (264, 264)	7 members (256, 251, 279, 298, 268, 258, 267)	4 members (282, 282, 251, 256)					13 members 3476 Average 267.4
300- 349		4 members (338, 325, 318, 321)						4 members 1302 Average 325.5
350- 399	1 member (387)		1 member (393)					2 members 780 Average 390
400-		2 members (437, 400)	1 member (422)					3 members 1259 Average 419.7
Total	131	22	19	29	28	23	97	349 36443 Average 104.7

Source: [www.val.se](http://www.val.se)